Sierra Club v. Clark: The Government Cries Wolf by Halleland, Keith J.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 11 | Issue 4 Article 3
1985
Sierra Club v. Clark: The Government Cries Wolf
Keith J. Halleland
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Halleland, Keith J. (1985) "Sierra Club v. Clark: The Government Cries Wolf," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 11: Iss. 4, Article 3.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss4/3
SIERRA CLUB v. CLARK: THE GOVERNMENT
CRIES WOLF
KEITH J. HALLELANDt
The eastern timber wolf, a species which once ranged throughout most
of the eastern United States, has been hunted to near extinction. The
few remaining wolves are located in Minnesota and are protected as a
threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. Yet the govern-
ment would allow the wolf to be hunted for sport. Relying on the
policies of the Act and its legislative history, the Eighth Circuit, in
Sierra Club v. Clark, limited a sport season on a threatened species
to the extraordinary case where the species exceeds the population lim-
its for its ecosystem.
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INTRODUCTION
The wolf has long been depicted in story and song as a
mysterious menace to man's very existence. This concept
of the wolf has become engrained in our attitudes and ap-
proach toward the wolf. As a result, we have been driven by
an ethic which would lead to the wolf's extinction. But Con-
gress has now mandated that each person who would slay
the wolf must stay his hand. When Congress took cogni-
zance of the fact that thousands of species of plants and ani-
mals had disappeared in past decades, and undertook to
curb that desecration, it declared that the wolf had a value
as an individual species in danger of extinction.'
In Sierra Club v. Clark,2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit recently ruled on a significant issue
under the Endangered Species Act:3 In what circumstances
may a governmental authority declare a sport season on a
threatened 4 species? In answering that question, the court of
appeals explicitly limited the government's authority to declare
a sport season to the extraordinary case 5 where a threatened
species exceeds the population limits of its ecosystem.6 This
ruling is an important victory for Minnesota's eastern timber
wolf, a species currently classified as threatened under the
Act.
7
Specifically at issue in Sierra Club were new federal Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) regulations which allowed the Minne-
1. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783, 790 (D. Minn. 1984) (Lord, J.).
2. 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
4. A threatened species is "any species which is likely to become an endangered
species within the foreseeable future." Id. § 1532(20). An endangered species is
"any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of
its range." Id. § 1532(6).
5. See id. § 1532(3). The Endangered Species Act defines conservation methods
and permits regulated taking in extraordinary cases "where population pressures
within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved." Id.; see also infra note 91 (text
of Endangered Species Act).
6. 755 F.2d at 613.
7. 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(d)(2) (1984). Other threatened species include the Ameri-
can alligator, id. § 17.42(a)(1), the grizzly bear, id. § 17.40(b)(1), and the bald eagle,
id. § 17.41(a)(1).
[Vol. I11
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sota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to declare a
sport trapping season on the wolf.8 These regulations were
promulgated without a showing by the government that the
wolf was overpopulated. 9 Several environmental groups' 0
brought suit challenging these new regulations in the United
States District Court for Minnesota." The district court held
the regulations invalid, ruling that, in allowing a sport season,
the Secretary breached his statutory duty to conserve the
wolf. 12 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling.'
3
This Article first details the history of the wolf population in
Minnesota. The Article then outlines the federal regulations
that allowed a sport season on the wolf. Next, the district
court and Eighth Circuit decisions, which declared the regula-
tions illegal, are discussed. Finally, this Article proposes that
Sierra Club stands not only as a significant victory for the wolf,
but as an important affirmance of the protectionist goals of the
Endangered Species Act-to be applied toward the preserva-
tion of all threatened species.'
4
I. THE WOLF AS A THREATENED SPECIES
The eastern timber wolf is geographically limited to approxi-
8. Id. § 17.40(d)(2)(i)(C) (permitting the Minnesota Department of Natural Re-
sources (DNR) to allow persons to take grey wolves in certain areas and under certain
conditions). For a more detailed discussion of the wolf regulations, see infra notes
74-83 and accompanying text.
9. See Sierra Club, 577 F. Supp. at 789-90.
10. In addition to the Sierra Club, other environmental groups that brought suit
were the Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals and Their Environment (FATE),
Wild Canid Research and Survival Center, Wildlife Education Program for a Living
Future, Northern American Wildlife Park Foundation, Inc., Help Our Wolves Live,
Inc., International Fund for Animal Welfare, Animal Welfare Institute, Humane Soci-
ety of the United States, Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, International
Ecology Society, Animal Rights Coalition, and the National Audubon Society. See id.
at 784.
11. Id. at 785.
12. Id. at 789-90.
13. 755 F.2d at 620.
14. Sierra Club may already have had an effect on the manner in which govern-
mental authorities approach the issue of a sport season on a threatened species. In
Montana, environmental groups gave notice to state wildlife authorities that they ob-
jected to a proposed sport season on the grizzly bear, a species classified as
threatened under the Act. The authorities recently informed the environmental
groups that there would not be a sport season on the grizzly bear this summer. Let-
ter from James W. Flynn, Director of Montana Dept. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, to
Brian B. O'Neill, Attorney for Sierra Club plaintiffs (Feb. 25, 1985).
1985]
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mately one percent of its historic range in the contiguous
United States.' 5 Approximately 1000 to 1200 wolves now re-
main in northern Minnesota.' 6 The Minnesota population is
the only significant remnant of the wolf population that once
ranged throughout most of the Eastern United States. 17 Small
populations exist in Michigan and Wisconsin.' 8
A. Minnesota's Past Attempts to Regulate the Wolf
Before passage of the Endangered Species Act, the wolf re-
ceived little protection in Minnesota. Between 1849 and 1965,
Minnesota offered a bounty for the killing of a timber wolf.' 9
Wolf depredation of livestock was a justification for this pro-
gram.20 Under the bounty program, aerial hunting by private
citizens substantially contributed to the apparent decline of the
wolf population in the late 1940's and 1950's.21
In addition to the bounty program, until 1956 Minnesota
employed hunters and trappers for the purpose of killing
wolves. 22 The total number of wolves killed in Minnesota from
1949 to 1956 averaged approximately 312 per year, which in-
cluded animals taken under the bounty program and by state-
employed hunters and trappers.
23
15. S. FRrTrs & L. DAVID MECH, DYNAMICS, MOVEMENTS, AND FEEDING ECOLOGY
OF A NEWLY PROTECTED WOLF POPULATION IN NORTHWESTERN MINNESOTA 6 (Wildlife
Monographs No. 80, 1981).
16. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783, 785 (D. Minn. 1984). The Minnesota
population has remained stable since 1975, after enactment of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act. See id.
17. See id.
18. Id. Approximately 25 wolves are found in Wisconsin, and only 14 on Isle
Royale, Michigan. Id.
19. See FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, WOLF DEPREDATION
ON LIVESTOCK IN MINNESOTA 2 (Resource Publication 145, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
FWS DEPREDATION STUDY].
20. Id. "A $3.00 bounty was placed on timber wolves in 1849 and varying
amounts were paid until the bounty was removed in 1965." SECTION OF WILDLIFE,
MINN. DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, MINNESOTA TIMBER WOLF MANAGEMENT PLAN 3
(1980) [hereinafter cited as MINNESOTA WOLF PLAN]. The Minnesota Legislature bi-
ennially authorized bounty payments. Id.
21. MINNESOTA WOLF PLAN, supra note 20, at 3. The bounty program ended in
1965 when, despite considerable pressure and criticism, Governor Karl Rolvaag ve-
toed the legislature's bounty appropriation. "No bounties have been paid on timber
wolves in Minnesota since then." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
[Vol. I11
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From 1956 to 1969, no state wolf control program existed.24
In 1969, the Minnesota Legislature funded a new Directed
Predator Control Program to reduce the number of coyote
depredations on sheep in northwestern counties of Minne-
sota.25 The program was not intended to address widespread
livestock depredations by wolves.2 6 Nevertheless, local trap-
pers registered under the program removed coyotes, foxes,
bobcats, lynxes, and wolves that were damaging domestic ani-
mals or wildlife.
2 7
B. Regulation of the Wolf After Passage of the Endangered Species
Act
With the passage of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,28
the wolf became a protected animal and was classified as an
endangered species in all of the lower forty-eight states.2 9
Wolves were thus completely protected from any taking in
Minnesota, whether by private citizens or the state.3 0
From the outset, Minnesota opposed federal protection of
the wolf. Minnesota initially disregarded the Act altogether
and allowed the taking of wolves under certain circum-
stances. 3' In response, the FWS informed the state that it was
violating the terms of the Act and that the taking of wolves
must be stopped.3 2
Thereafter, the Minnesota DNR Commissioner petitioned
the FWS to exclude Minnesota's wolf population from the en-
dangered range.33 The FWS postponed its decision on the pe-
24. FWS DEPREDATION STUDY, supra note 19, at 3. Any member of the public,
however, could hunt wolves during this period. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id Controllers were paid $50 for each wolf taken and $35 for each coyote,
bobcat, or lynx, and five dollars for each fox. Id.
27. Id
28. Pub. L. No. 93-205, §§ 1-17, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1543).
29. 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(d)(1); 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B). Section 1538(a)(l)(B)
forbids any "taking" of an endangered animal. The term "take" is defined under the
Endangered Species Act as "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, cap-
ture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." See id. § 1532(19).
30. FWS DEPREDATION STUDY, supra note 19, at 3.
31. See Letter from Lynn A. Greenwalt, Director, Fish and Wildlife Service to
Robert L. Herbst, Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources (Sept. 5, 1974).
32. Id.
33. Sierra Club, 577 F. Supp. at 785; see also MINNESOTA WOLF PLtAN, supra note 20,
at 5.
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tition :pending a report by the Eastern Timber Wolf Recovery
Team.34 In the meantime, wolf depredation control became
the responsibility of the federal government. 35
C. The Federal Government Takes Over the Depredation Control
Program
The FWS began its depredation control program in early
1975 and responded to complaints of wolf-livestock problems
on or near problem farms.36 Because the Endangered Species
Act prevented the killing of wolves, the FWS began live trap-
ping and translocating captured wolves into remote areas of
northern Minnesota. 37 The FWS subsequently found that the
translocated wolves left the release sites within a few days and
eventually drifted back into or through areas containing live-
stock.38 Thus, relocation of the wolves did not adequately
solve the depredation problem. 39 To remedy the situation, the
Eastern Timber Wolf Recovery Team recommended that the
wolf be reclassified in Minnesota from endangered to
threatened. 40 Under this new classification, which was adopted
by the FWS in 1978, authorized state or federal personnel
could kill wolves that had committed "significant depredations
on lawfully present domestic animals," 41 as long as such taking
was done in a "humane manner."
42
Federal wildlife experts believed that the new wolf classifica-
tion would provide the flexibility required to carry out an effec-
tive depredation control program. 43 It was also believed that
the new classification would provide greater protection for
34. See FWS DEPREDATION STUDY, supra note 19, at 3. The Eastern Timber Wolf
Recovery Team consists of experts brought together by the FWS to develop a strat-
egy for conservation of the wolf. The creation of such a recovery plan is mandated by
the Endangered Species Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).
35. See FWS DEPREDATION STUDY, supra note 19, at 3.
36. Id.
37. Id. 108 wolves were translocated under this program between 1975 and early
1978. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 3; Final Regulations Governing the Reclassification of the Grey Wolf
in the United States and Mexico, with Determination of Critical Habitat in Michigan
and Minnesota, 43 Fed. Reg. 9706 (1978) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. Pt. 17) [herein-
after cited as 1978 Wolf Regulations].
41. 1978 Wolf Regulations, supra note 40, 43 Fed. Reg. at 9615.
42. Id.
43. See FWS DEPREDATION STUDY, supra note 19, at 4.
[Vol. I11
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farmers, reduce local opposition to wolves, and at the same
time afford ample protection for wolves as required under the
Act.44 Moreover, the taking of wolves was restricted to the in-
dividual wolf or wolves believed to be responsible for a partic-
ular depredation problem.45
In the summer of 1978, a dispute arose between environ-
mental groups and the FWS regarding the method by which
wolves were being taken under the depredation program. In
Fund for Animals v. Andrus,46 the groups charged that the FWS
was not following its own regulations. Trappers were killing
wolves as far away as five miles from problem farms. These
wolves were not believed responsible for the particular depre-
dation problems at those farms. 47
The Fund for Animals court concluded that the regulations
were intended to allow the killing of wolves only after a signifi-
cant depredation occurred. 48 More importantly, the court lim-
ited the taking of wolves to the particular wolf or wolves
reasonably believed to have committed the significant depre-
dation. 49 The court also limited the area in which federal offi-
cials could trap wolves to within one-quarter mile of the farm
where the livestock was killed.50
D. Current Analysis of the Wolf-Livestock Problem
Despite the decision in Fund for Animals, state officials contin-
ued to argue that the wolf-livestock problem in northern Min-
nesota creates an unbearable situation for local farmers. 51 A
recent study issued by the FWS, however, concludes that the
wolf-livestock problem is exaggerated and, in reality, is a rela-
tively minor one.52 The study suggests that livestock losses at-
tributed to wolves are closely related to poor animal
44. Id
45. See 1978 Wolf Regulations, supra note 40, 43 Fed. Reg. at 9615 (authorities
"may take a grey wolf without a permit in Minnesota if such action is necessary to
remove . . . a grey wolf committing significant depredations").
46. 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189 (1978).
47. Id. at 2191.
48. Id. at 2200.
49. Id. at 2200-01.
50. Id. at 2203. The court also prevented the trapping of wolf pups. See id. at
2202; see also FWS DEPREDATION STUDY, supra note 19, at 4.
51. See Letter from Representive Irvin N. Anderson to Eugene F. Hester, Acting
Deputy Director of FWS (Sept. 28, 1981).
52. FWS DEPREDATION STUDY, supra note 19, at 4.
1985]
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management practices, such as permitting livestock to calf in
the woods, or disposing of livestock carcassess in or near
pastures. 53
The study further indicates that the Federal Depredation
Control Program successfully reduced livestock losses at most
farms and, along with improved livestock management tech-
niques, effectively resolved isolated incidents of livestock dep-
redation.M The FWS study also notes that many wolf packs
actually lived near farms without any instances of livestock kill-
ing by wolves. 55 Farmers who suffered livestock losses were
compensated by the state for each animal killed or injured by
wolves.5 6 As concluded in the FWS study, however, propo-
nents of Minnesota's Livestock Compensation Program gener-
ally overestimate the extent of the depredation problem. 57
E. Minnesota Attempts to Regain Control of the Wolf
Because of continued dissatifaction with federal control of
the wolf population, the DNR requested the FWS to transfer
control of the wolf to Minnesota. 58 As a prerequisite to such a
transfer, the DNR demanded a sport season on the wolf. The
DNR proposed a "harvest" of fifty wolves within the first
year. 59 Thereafter, the DNR would adjust the number of
wolves taken according to the density of the wolf population. 60
In requiring transfer of management of the wolf population,
DNR officials have made clear that they reject the entire notion
that the wolf is or ever has been threatened or endangered in
Minnesota. 6 1 DNR officials instead consider as a top priority
the task of maintaining and increasing Minnesota's deer popu-
53. See id. at 5-6.
54. Id. at 8-10.
55. Id. at 7. Only two farms had regular annual problems since 1975. Id. at 9.
56. MINN. STAT. § 3.737 (1984).
57. FWS DEPREDATION STUDY, supra note 19, at 4. A single sheep rancher re-
ceived 66% of the total compensation paid for 1977. A single cattle rancher received
42% of the amount paid in 1978. That same rancher received 51% of the amount
paid for livestock losses in 1979. Id.
58. See Proposed Regulations Governing the Grey Wolf in Minnesota, 47 Fed.
Reg. 30,528 (1982) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. Pt. 17) (proposed July 14, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1982 Proposed Wolf Regulations].
59. MINNESOTA WOLF PLAN, supra note 20, at 15.
60. Id.
61. Letter fromJoseph N. Alexander, DNR Commissioner, to G. Ray Arnett, As-
sistant Secretary-Designate for Fish, Wildlife and Parks (Mar. 26, 1981) [hereinafter
cited as 1981 DNR Comm'r Letter].
[Vol. I11
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lation. 62 Moreover, the DNR has announced that it is commit-
ted to "management" of the wolf as a fur bearer, as
demonstrated in the following letter:
We do not believe that the wolf now or ever has been either
endangered or threatened in [Minnesota]. We believe, as
this administration does, that states can and must manage
those resources that fall within their borders. We respect-
fully request the return of this program to the control of the
State of Minnesota.
Our management objectives are as follows:
1) To maintain optimum wolf density and range,
2) To manage the wolf as a fur bearer with closely regulated
harvest,
3) To provide adequate enforcement and information,
and
4) To provide for population monitoring and research. 63
The FWS initially rejected the DNR's repeated proposals re-
garding management of the wolf population. 64 Under the
FWS's interpretation, the Endangered Species Act precluded a
sport season on the wolf.65 The FWS also stated that the
DNR's proposal would directly violate the Fund for Animals
decision.6
6
Under the Reagan Administration and the direction of Sec-
retary of the Interior James Watt, the FWS reversed its posi-
tion.67 This change of position undoubtedly arose partially
from state political pressure. Public antagonism toward the
wolf is of a long-standing nature, as evidenced by the illegal
killing of approximately 250 wolves in Minnesota each year.68
One reason for this public antagonism toward wolves is wolf
depredation of livestock.69 In addition, like man himself, the
62. See MINNESOTA WOLF PLAN, supra note 20, at 13.
63. See 1981 DNR Comm'r Letter, supra note 61 (emphasis added).
64. See Letter from Harvey K. Nelson, Regional Director of FWS, to Joseph N.
Alexander, DNR Commissioner (Aug. 6, 1980).
65. Id.
66. Letter from Elmer T. Nitzschke, Field Solicitor, U.S. Deptartment of the Inte-
rior, to Harvey Nelson, Regional Director FWS, at 1 (Mar. 7, 1980); Letter from Lynn
A. Greenwalt, Director FWS to the Regional Director, at 4 (June 27, 1980); 11 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189 (D. Minn. 1978).
67. 1982 Proposed Regulations, supra note 58, 47 Fed. Reg. at 30,528.
68. 577 F. Supp. at 790; see also Deposition of David Mech, at 9 (Oct. 25, 1983)
(illegal take of between 25-30% of total wolf population in Minnesota).
69. FWS DEPREDATION STUDY, supra note 19, at 4. Yet the wolf depredation
problem is exaggerated, as conceded by the FWS. Id.; cf Goldman-Carter, Federal
1985]
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wolf is a predator which sometimes competes with man for the
same food sources, such as the deer population. Moreoever,
as a result of long-established fears and superstitions, people
are generally hostile toward the wolf. The public does not un-
derstand the wolf's habits and ecology. 70 Thus, the DNR con-
tinues to assert that one way to reduce public antagonism is to
allow a sport season on wolves. 7'
In July of 1982, the FWS proposed regulations which re-
turned control of the wolf to Minnesota and allowed a sport
trapping season. 72 Final wolf regulations were issued on Au-
gust 10, 1983, 7s which subsequently led to the federal court
controversy in Sierra Club.
II. THE DECLARATION OF A SPORT SEASON ON THE WOLF
A. The Federal Regulations
The final wolf regulations promulgated by the Reagan Ad-
ministration specifically allowed the State of Minnesota to de-
clare a sport trapping season on the wolf.74 To implement the
season, the FWS divided the state into five wolf zones. 7
5 Wolf
depredation control was allowed in zones two, three, four, and
five, where the wolf-livestock problem was believed most sig-
nificant. 76 Trapping in zones two, three, and four was allowed
depending on certain wolf density restrictions.
77
Under these rules, no more than fifty wolves could be taken
during the first year after enactment in zone four.78 Additional
taking by federal or state employees would be allowed if the
public trapping season did not exceed the taking limits, and if
Conservation of Threatened Species: By Administrative Discretion or Legislative Standard, 11
B.C. ENvTL. L. REV. 63 (1983).
70. See Goldman-Carter, supra note 69, at 70. For example, humans perceive
that wolves destroy deer populations. See id. at 71; see also MINNESOTA WOLF PLAN,
supra note 20, at 11. The DNR intends to reduce wolf populations to benefit the deer
to the maximum extent possible. See Goldman-Carter, supra note 69, at 71.
71. 577 F. Supp. at 790; Deposition of David Mech, supra note 68, at 19-22.
72. 1982 Proposed Regulations, supra note 58, 47 Fed. Reg. at 30,528.
73. Final Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256 (1983) (codified at 50 C.F.R. Pt. 17
(1984)).
74. 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(d)(c).
75. Id. § 17.40(d)(1).
76. Id. § 17.40(d)(2)(i)(B)(4).
77. Id. Any trapping in zone 3 was contigent on an average population density
of not less than one wolf per ten square miles within the zone. Id. § 17.40(d)(2)
(i)(C)(1).
78. Id. § 17.40(d)(2)(i)(C)(3).
[Vol. I11
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the average population densities for zones three and four
would not be reduced.7
9
The new regulations also greatly modified the existing live-
stock depredation control program. The taking of wolves
would not be limited to the individual predator wolf responsi-
ble for particular livestock losses.80 The rules do not require
that wolves be taken in a humane manner.8' In addition, the
trapping distance from a farm that alleged a number of depre-
dations was increased from one-quarter mile to one-half
mile.8 2 The new regulations also allowed trading in wolf
pelts.83
In opposition to the new regulations, several environmental
groups brought suit against the federal government in Sierra
Club.84 The groups alleged that the regulations violated the
terms of the Endangered Species Act and the federal court de-
cision in Fund for Animals.
8 5
B. The District Court Decision
The primary issue before the district court in Sierra Club was
whether the Secretary of the Interior breached his statutory
duty to conserve the wolf within the meaning of the Act by
allowing a sport season on the wolf.8 6 The government did
not contend that the wolf population had exceeded the popu-
lation limits of its ecosystem. 7 Rather, the government
presented the novel argument that a sport season on the wolf
would reduce the level of public antagonism toward the wolf,
thereby helping to conserve the wolf within the meaning of the
Act.8 8 ChiefJudge Miles Lord soundly rejected this argument:
It is argued that the public in northern Minnesota sees the
79. Id. § 17.40(d)(2)(i)(D).
80. See id. § 17.40(d)(2)(i)(C).
81. See id. § 17.40(d).
82. Id. § 17.40(d)(2)(i)(B)(4).
83. See id. § 17.40(d)(2)(ii)(B).
84. 577 F. Supp. 783 (D. Minn. 1984).
85. 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189 (D. Minn. 1978). In proceedings before
Judge Miles Lord in Sierra Club, the government moved to reopen Fund for Animals.
Judge Lord was asked to either clarify or dissolve the court's prior order so that the
new regulations would not conflict with that order. The plaintiffs also moved the
court to reopen Fund for Animals on the ground that the court's order in that case was
in conflict with the new regulations. 577 F. Supp. at 785.
86. See id. at 787-89.
87. Id. at 789.
88. Id. at 790.
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wolf as having little value. This is said to contribute to the
estimated number of 250 illegal killings that afflict the wolf
each year. While these illegal killings must be stopped, this
can hardly be accomplished by allowing a sport season and
creating a market in wolf pelts. An attempt to 'manage' the
wolf in this manner is to treat the wolf as a furbearer, and
not as a threatened species whose value is determined by its
rightful place in nature.
8 9
The Secretary also argued that the declaration of a sport sea-
son was within his discretion under the Act. 90 The district
court rejected this argument, relying on its interpretation of
the term "conservation" as defined in the Act. 9' The court
concluded that the meaning of "conservation" prevented a
sport season except in the "extraordinary" case where "popu-
lation pressure within the animal's ecosystem cannot otherwise
be relieved." 92 Since the government conceded that the wolf
population had been stable since 1975, the court found that
the Secretary breached his statutory duty to conserve the wolf
within the meaning of the Act. 93 Moreover, the court held
that, based on the language of the Act, the Secretary had an
affirmative duty to increase the population of the wolf.
94
89. Id.
90. See id. at 788. The Secretary based his argument on section 1533(d) of the
Act. This section provides in part that to protect a threatened species "the Secretary
shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the
conservation of the species." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d). The statute also provides that the
Secretary may prohibit the taking of an endangered species. Id. § 1533(d),
1538(a)(1). Thus, the Secretary argued that he may or may not prohibit the taking of
a threatened species. 577 F. Supp. at 788. The court stated that such a conclusion
ignores congressional intent regarding the meaning of conservation under the Act.
Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 10 1-12.
91. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(1). The statute defines conservation as:
the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the meas-
ures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary. Such meth-
ods and procedures include, but are not limited to, all activities associated
with scientific resources management such as research, census, law enforce-
ment, habitat acquisition and maintenance, propagation, live trapping, and
transplantation, and, in the extraordinary case where population pressures
within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, may include regu-
lated taking.
Id.; see infra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
92. Sierra Club, 577 F. Supp. at 789.
93. Id. at 789-90.
94. The court stated that:
From both a plain reading of the Act and research into its legislative
history, this court concludes that the Secretary clearly has an affirmative
duty to bring the wolf population to a point where the protections of the Act
[Vol. I11
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C. Sierra Club v. Clark: The Eighth Circuit Decision
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit,95 the government again ar-
gued that the regulations allowing a sport season on the wolf
were a permissible exercise of the Secretary's discretion.
96
The Eighth Circuit treated this issue strictly as a question of
statutory interpretation under the Endangered Species Act.
97
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit decision firmly upheld the dis-
trict court opinion regarding its interpretation of the Act.98
Like the district court, the Eighth Circuit found that the Secre-
tary breached his duty to conserve the wolf when he declared a
sport season.
The Eighth Circuit adopted a plain-language reading of the
Act and concluded that the definition of conservation under
the Act explicitly limits a sport season to the extraordinary case
where ecosystem population pressures cannot otherwise be re-
lieved.99 The court found that for the Secretary to permit a
sport season without such a finding would not be "an act of
conservation under the Act and would fall without the scope of
authority granted to the Secretary."' 00 The Eighth Circuit em-
phasized that Congress intended federal officers and agencies
to strive to conserve all endangered and threatened species.' ° '
According to the court, the Act underscores the significance of
the term "conservation," which appears frequently in the
Act.102 The court further found that to reject Congress' defini-
are no longer needed. To 'conserve' the wolf does not mean to 'manage'
the wolf by declaring a public hunting season. For to do so, would be
against the declaration of Congress that the number of wolves be increased.
Id. at 789. In addition, Judge Lord ruled that the government's expansion of the
wolf depredation program was done without explanation and was illegal under the
Act. Id. at 790; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
95. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 608 (8th Cir. 1985).
96. Id. at 612.
97. Id. at 618. The court stated that:
We view the issue before us as one primarily of interpretation of the
statute. Much of the factual background concerning the wolf, a major part
of the discussion in the briefs and of the oral arguments of the amicus par-
ties, and much of the colorful language in the district court's opinion,
although of substantial interest, simply do not reach the issue that we are
required to decide.
Id.
98. See id. at 613.
99. Id. Additionally, the court stated that legislative intent can be ascertained
from the definition of a word in different sections of the statute. Id.
100. Id. at 613.
101. Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c).
102. 755 F.2d at 613.
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tion of conservation would be to refuse to give effect to a cru-
cial part of the law.10 3
The court of appeals refused to adopt several arguments
made by the Secretary, which called for a lenient interpretation
of the Secretary's discretion under the Act. First, the Secretary
argued that the district court's holding nullified the Secretary's
broad discretion under specific provisions by relying on the
Act's general definition of conservation. 0 4 The Eighth Circuit
ruled that "there is no nullification involved in utilizing Con-
gress's definition of 'conservation.' "105 Instead, the court
concluded that "in applying the statutory definition of 'conser-
vation' to all portions of the Act in which it appears, we have
amplification and clarification of the meaning of the Act."' 10 6
The Secretary also contended that the district court's order
effectively eliminated any distinction between the Secretary's
discretion in managing a threatened species, as opposed to an
endangered species.' 0 7 The Secretary relied on section
1533(d), which provides that the Secretary "may by regulation
prohibit with respect to any threatened species any act prohib-
ited under section 1538(a)(1) of this title, in the case of fish or
wildlife."' 08 Section 1538(a)(1) strictly prohibits the taking of
several endangered species. 10 9 The Secretary argued that
since he could not order the regulated taking of an endangered
species, he could order a taking with regard to a threatened
species." lO
Again, the Eighth Circuit rejected the Secretary's arguments
based on the definition of conservation. The Eighth Circuit
held that its decision did not destroy the two-tiered level of
protection under the Act. 1" Rather, the court stated that the
Secretary's argument "simply ignores the language of the Act
and the statutory definitions that Congress adopted."'" 2
In addition to the plain language of the Act, the Eighth Cir-
cuit found further support for this ruling in the Act's legislative
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 614.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
109. Id. § 1538(a)(1).
110. 755 F.2d at 614.
111. Id. at 614-15.
112. Id. at 615.
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history. The court noted that the Conference Report submit-
ted with the Act clearly evidenced an intent to limit the circum-
stances under which the Secretary could permit a taking of a
threatened species."13 The court placed great weight on this
unambiguous 14 language in the Conference Report which de-
lineated the extreme circumstances under which a carefully
controlled sport season might be allowed.
Despite the explicit language in the Conference Report, the
Secretary argued that other legislative history supported a
broader interpretation of the Secretary's discretion under the
Act."15 The Secretary first pointed to a portion of the House
Report which allowed the Secretary to authorize taking of a
threatened animal as one of an "infinite number of options"
which are available. 1 6
In reply to this argument, the Eighth Circuit noted that the
remainder of the House Report limited the Secretary's discre-
113. Id.; see CONF. REP. No. 740, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in 1973 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3001, 3002 [hereinafter cited as 1973 CONF. REP.]. The
pertinent section of the Conference Report states:
In view of the varying responsibilities assigned to the administering agencies
in the bill, the term [conservation] was redefined to include generally the
kinds of activities that might be engaged in to improve the status of endan-
gered and threatened species so that they would no longer require special
treatment. The concept of conservation covers the full spectrum of such
activities: from total 'hands off policies involving protection from harass-
ment to a careful and intensive program of control. In extreme circum-
stances, as where a given species exceeds the carrying capacity of its
particular ecosystem and where this pressure can be relieved in no other
feasible way, this 'conservation' might include authority for carefully con-
trolled taking of surplus members of the species. To state that this possibil-
ity exists, however, in no way is intended to suggest that this extreme
situation is likely to occur-it is just to say that the authority exists in the
unlikely event that it ever becomes needed.
Id.
114. 755 F.2d at 615 ("Because a 'conference report represents the final state-
ment of terms agreed to by both houses, next to the statute itself it is the most per-
suasive evidence of congressional intent' ") (citing Dembey v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d
507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 616.
116. Id. The Secretary relied on the following language in the House Report:
The Secretary is authorized to issue appropriate regulations to protect en-
dangered or threatened species; he may also make specifically applicable any
of the prohibitions with regard to threatened species that have been listed in
Section 9(a) [16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)] as are prohibited with regard to en-
dangered species. Once an animal is on the threatened list, the Secretary
has an almost infinite number of options available to him with regard to the
permitted activities for those species. He may, for example, permit taking,
but not importation of such species, or he may choose to forbid both taking
and importation but allow the transportation of such species.
H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973).
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tion to the exercise of options which "would serve to conserve,
protect, or restore the species concerned in accordance with
the purposes of the Act." ' "1 7 These options were supplied "to
provide a means for protecting the ecosystems upon which we
and other species depend."' 1 8 The Eighth Circuit concluded
that the House Report was consistent with the purposes of the
Act in terms of the protection and conservation of threatened
species. 119
The Secretary then relied on language found in the Senate
version of the bill that explicitly authorized him to declare a
sport season on a threatened species.' 2 0 Under this bill, the
Secretary could issue necessary regulations to provide for con-
servation and management of a species.' 2' Conservation and
management were defined as activities directed at "increasing
and maintaining the number of animals within species and
populations of endangered and threatened species at the opti-
mum carrying capacity of their habitat."' 22 It was further
stated that these terms may include "regulation and taking
necessary to these ends."' 123
As pointed out by the Eighth Circuit, however, the Confer-
ence Committee rejected the Senate bill's definition of conser-
vation and management.' 2 4 The term "management" was
completely deleted.' 25 In defining conservation, the Confer-
ence Committee deleted the language "optimum carrying ca-
pacity" and inserted the present language "to bring any
endangered or threatened species to the point at which the
measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer nec-
117. 755 F.2d at 616 (citing H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 11).
118. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 10).
119. Id. at 617.
120. Id. at 616. The Senate bill read:
Whenever the Secretary lists a species of fish or wildlife as a threatened spe-
cies, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, he shall issue such regula-
tions as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation,
protection, restoration, or propogation of such species. With respect to any
threatened species, the Secretary may by regulation prohibit any act prohib-
ited with respect to an endangered species under § 10(a) of this Act.
S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(e), 119 CONG. REC. 25,662, 25,664 (1973).
121. S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(e), 119 CONG. REC. at 25,664.
122. 755 F.2d at 616 (quoting S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(1)).
123. Id. This amendment is apparently intended to minimize the federal preemp-
tion of state authority to regulate the taking of resident wildlife.
124. 755 F.2d at 616-17; see 1973 CONF. REP., supra note 113, at 3002.
125. See 1973 CONF. REP., supra note 113, at 3002; cf 16 U.S.C. § 1543(3) (defin-
ing conservation).
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essary."'126 The Conference Committee also stated that con-
trolled taking of surplus members of a species should be
limited to "extreme circumstances, as where a given species
exceeds the carrying capacity of its particular ecosystem and
where this pressure can be relieved in no other feasible
way."
2 7
In citing the Conference Report, the Eighth Circuit dis-
cussed whether or not the Secretary could ignore the explicit
language in the Conference Report which rejected the Senate
version of the bill. 128 The Eighth Circuit determined that
based on the Act's final definition of conservation, a sport sea-
son on the wolf could not be permitted absent an extraordi-
nary case finding.'
29
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Ross argued that the majority's
interpretation of the Act was too narrow in limiting the Secre-
tary's discretion. 30 Judge Ross based his decision on a differ-
ent interpretaton of conservation.' 3 ' He also argued that the
majority opinion did not serve to fulfill the purposes of the En-
dangered Species Act.' 3 2 Judge Ross suggested that the ma-
jority's decision would, in fact, prevent the conservation of a
threatened species in certain circumstances.13 3  To illustrate
this point, Judge Ross discussed a hypothetical scenario in
which several members of a pack of wolves were afflicted with a
highly contagious disease.'s 4 Judge Ross argued that the ma-
jority's interpretation of conservation would not allow the Sec-
retary to implement a regulated taking of the diseased wolves
to prevent the spread of disease, since the situation would not
constitute a "case where population pressures . . . could not
126. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3); see 1973 CONF. REP., supra note 113, at 3002.
127. 1973 CONF. REP., supra note 113, at 3002.
128. See 755 F.2d at 615-17.
129. Id. at 617. The court of appeals further held that the district court had not
adequately addressed the government's reasons for changing the wolf depredation
program. The court remanded the case to the district court for further findings on
the government's reasons. Id. at 618-19.
130. Id. at 620-22 (Ross, J., dissenting).
131. Id at 621. Specifically, Judge Ross relied on the "but are not limited to"
language of the statutory definition, arguing that such language expanded rather
than limited the Secretary's discretion with regard to the regulated taking of
threatened species. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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otherwise be relieved." 35
As pointed out by the majority, however, a specific provision
in the Act provides for the taking of depredating or diseased
animals from a threatened species population when neces-
sary. 13 6 The majority concluded that although a sport season
required a specific extraordinary case finding, the Act would
not similarly limit the taking of diseased members of a
species. 13
7
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT DECISION
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Sierra Club is significant for
the wolf and far-ranging in terms of the limitation placed on
the Secretary's discretion to declare a sport season on a
threatened species. The case of the wolf in Minnesota illus-
trazes the problem of allowing localized control of a threatened
species population. The declaration of a sport season on the
wolf was not so much a question of biological science, but a
sociological question concerning human attitudes toward the
wolf.13 8 Public antagonism brought to the forefront by local
politicians undoubtedly played a significant role in the federal
government's willingness to allow a sport season. Ironically, it
is perhaps these same pressures which led to the wolf's original
decline to the status of a threatened species in Minnesota.
The central question in Sierra Club was whether or not the
Secretary would be allowed to return control of the wolf to a
state that was intent on treating the wolf as a game animal, and
which would allow a regulated harvest of the wolf. The Eighth
Circuit concluded that Congress specifically rejected the no-
tion that a sport season on a threatened species could bejusti-
fied without a separate showing that population pressures
within the animal's ecosystem could not otherwise be relieved.
The court's decision is significant in terms of what the Secre-
tary may consider when managing a threatened species. It will
no longer be possible for the Secretary to bend to political or
sociological pressures in conserving a threatened species. In-
stead, the Secretary is directed to take those steps that will ulti-
135. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3)).
136. Id. at 614 n.8; see 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A).
137. 755 F.2d at 614 n.8.
138. See 577 F. Supp. at 790.
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mately bring the population of a threatened species to the
point where the protections of the Act are no longer necessary.
A. The Court's Reliance on the Fundamental Policies of the Act
When Congress passed the Act in December of 1973, it de-
clared that threatened and endangered species of fish, wildlife,
and plants "are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
recreational and scientific value to the Nation and its peo-
ple." 39 Congress intended to "provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened species
depend, may be conserved,"' 40 and "to provide a program for
the conservation of such endangered and threatened
species."' 4 1
A critical feature of the Act is to protect those species
threatened with extinction. "It is far more sound to take the
steps necessary to keep a species or subspecies from becoming
endangered than to attempt to save it after it has reached the
critical point."' 142 If Congress had granted the Secretary of the
Interior such broad discretionary powers in allowing a sport
season on threatened species, Congress would have run the
risk of undermining this critical feature of the Act.
Prior to the federal court decision in Sierra Club, no court had
specifically addressed the question of the extent of the Secre-
tary's authority to allow a sport season on a threatened spe-
cies. 143 The court of appeals' decision makes clear that the
Secretary has an affirmative duty to increase the numbers of a
139. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(3).
140. Id. § 1531(b).
141. Id.
142. H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1973) (Departmental Report
from Rogers C.B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior).
143. Cf Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977). In De-
fenders of Wildlife, the issue did not concern a sport season, but the permissible hour of
migratory bird hunting. The court ruled that the regulations which allowed twilight
hunting were invalid because they did not adequately protect certain protected
species:
It is clear from the face of the statute that the Fish and Wildlife Service, as
part of the Interior, must do far more than merely avoid the elimination of a
protected species. It must bring these species back from the brink so that
they may be removed from the protected class, and it must use all methods
necessary to do so. The Service cannot limit its focus to what it considers
the most important management tool available to it . . .to accomplish this
end . . . . [Tihe agency has an affirmative duty to increase the population
of protected species.
Id. at 170.
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threatened species. Management of a threatened species is not
simply a question of whether a given regulation will or will not
"hurt" a particular species, but whether a given regulation will
actually increase numbers of the species.
B. The Court's Interpretation of the Act's Legislative History
As pointed out by the Eighth Circuit, the legislative history
of the Act fully outlines what discretion is given the Secretary
in regulating a threatened species. 44 Both the House and the
Senate intended to improve the state of all fish and wildlife
classified as threatened under the Act. t 45 In early testimony
before the Senate, Nathaniel Reed, Assistant Secretary for the
FWS, testified that the Secretary's authority to issue threatened
species regulations was intended
to provide a halfway house for those animals which have
been restored to the point that they are no longer
threatened with extinction, but have not yet responded to
the point at which they are ready to be completely removed
from the protective umbrella of the Endangered Species
Conservation Act.
146
Reed analogized the moving of a species from the endangered
to the threatened category to "a hospital where the patient is
transferred from the intensive care unit to the general ward
until he is ready to be discharged."' 1
47
Early congressional debate points toward a view which al-
lowed state or federal wildlife agencies considerable discretion
to take threatened species. 48 Yet as noted by the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Sierra Club, the Senate versions of the definitions of con-
servation and management were rejected when they reached
the Conference Committee. 149 The changes made by the Con-
ference Committee narrowed the focus of conservation meas-
ures in favor of increasing the populations of threatened
species. The committee rejected the notion that a threatened
species population be maintained at an artificial "optimum car-
144. See supra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
146. Hearings on S. 249, S. 2199 and S. 3818 Before the Subcomm. on Environment of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 68, 69-70 (1972).
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
149. 755 F.2d at 617; see also 1973 CONF. REP., supra note 113, at 3002; supra notes
121-30 and accompanying text.
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rying capacity" within a particular ecosystem. Instead, the
committee adopted the extraordinary case language relied on
by the Eighth Circuit. 150
C. The Rejection of a Consumptive Ethic of Wildlife Management
The difference between the language of optimum carrying
capacity and the ultimate definition of conservation adopted by
the Conference Committee reflects two fundamentally differ-
ent approaches toward management of a threatened species.
Legal scholars assert that the optimum carrying capacity ap-
proach reflects the attitude of a consumption-oriented soci-
ety. 15' Americans and western cultures generally view their
natural resources, such as land, water, forests, and wildlife, as
available for financial gain and physical comfort. As a result,
these resources are not of value until they become usable as a
product or device. Congress itself recognized this consump-
tion ethic when it declared the need for protection of endan-
gered and threatened animals as "a consequence of economic
growth and development untempered by adequate concern
and conservation."'
152
The traditional approach toward wildlife management is to
raise productivity of a particular species of fish or wildlife to
increase the consumption of that species as a resource. 153
State and federal fish and wildlife agencies employ the majority
of wildlife managers. 54 These agencies traditionally receive
their financing from hunting and fishing license fees and
equipment, taxes, and such items as duck stamp proceeds. 55
It is not unreasonable to assume that wildlife managers are
sympathetic to the views of hunters and trappers.
The Endangered Species Act is a specific legislative mandate
directed toward changing the attitude of our society from a
more consumption-oriented ethic to a protectionist ethic by
which the populations of endangered and threatened fish and
wildlife will be increased. The controversy surrounding a
150. 1973 CONF. REP., supra note 113, at 3002; see also Goldman-Carter, supra note
69, at 74-75 (discussing Conference Committee's "extraordinary case" language).
151. Goldman-Carter, supra note 69, at 94-95.
152. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(i).
153. Coggins & Ward, The Law of Wildlife Management on the Federal Public Lands, 60
OR. L. REV. 59, 66 (1981).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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sport season on the eastern timber wolf reflects the tension be-
tween the traditional, more consumption-oriented view of
wildlife management and the protectionist goals found in the
Endangered Species Act. Minnesota DNR officials consistently
argue that the wolf should be treated as a furbearer with a
closely regulated harvest, despite the fact that the wolf is listed
as a threatened animal under the Act.' 56
The DNR's approach toward "management" of the wolf
population is precisely the kind of wildlife management against
which Congress intended to legislate. Moreover, the vulnera-
bility of state and federal wildlife agencies to this consumption-
oriented ethic is exactly the dilemma which prompted Con-
gress to impose an explicit prohibition against sport seasons
on threatened animals, except where the animal has become
overpopulated. To "conserve" the wolf within the meaning of
the Act does not mean to allow a sport season where no proof
exists that the wolf has become overpopulated.
Without specific limitations on the management of a
threatened species, it is possible that certain individuals in our
society will succeed in reducing the magnificence of a
threatened species, such as the wolf, to the level of a product
to be manipulated by humans. As the Endangered Species Act
now stands, this manipulation is prohibited. In Minnesota,
however, state officials refuse to protect the wolf from illegal
killing without first establishing a sport trapping season. This
prerequisite to conserving the wolf ignores the terms of the
Act and fails to recognize the wolf as an individual species in
danger of extinction. Particularly appropriate are the words of
Judge Lord in ruling that a sport season on the wolf would not
be allowed:
Plaintiffs have urged .that state and federal governments
are doing little, if anything, to prevent the illegal killing of
wolves. The court finds it very difficult to conclude other-
wise when almost one quarter of the wolf population is ille-
gally slaughtered each year. There is no evidence, at least
in federal court, that anyone has been prosecuted for these
killings. It is apparent that the manpower to enforce the law
is there, the quid pro quo being the allowance of a hunting
season. But the duty imposed by Congress to increase the
wolf population does not hinge upon the existence of a
156. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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sport season. Every step must be taken to enforce the law
as it stands.
157
CONCLUSION
Faced with an issue of first impression, the Eighth Circuit in
Sierra Club interpreted the statutory authority given to govern-
mental authorities to declare a sport season on a threatened
species. The court limited the circumstances under which a
sport season could be allowed to cases where population pres-
sures within the species' ecosystem cannot otherwise be re-
lieved. Since there was no evidence that the eastern timber
wolf had exceeded the population limits of its ecosystem, the
court would not permit a sport season on the wolf.
Sierra Club is particularly important in light of the public con-
troversy which surrounds the management of a threatened
species such as the timber wolf. In northern Minnesota, the
wolf is the subject of great public antagonism stemming in part
from depredation of livestock and conflicts between humans
and wolves regarding the deer population. A general fear and
hatred of the wolf prevails.
The controversy surrounding the eastern timber wolf in
Minnesota illustrates the problem of managing a species which
has become threatened due to long-standing environmental
and sociological problems. This continuing problem only fur-
ther evidences the need for a clear standard to be applied by
governmental authorities engaged in the management of
threatened animals. In Sierra Club, the Eighth Circuit re-
sponded to this need by disallowing a sport season on the wolf.
This decision upholds the purposes of the Endangered Species
Act and furthers the preservation of all threatened species, as
Congress originally intended.
157. 577 F. Supp. at 790.
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